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Introduction 
 
[1] Recent philosophy of mind and epistemology has seen an important and influential 
trend towards accounting for at least some features of experiences in content-
involving terms. It is a contested point whether ascribing content to experiences can 
account for all the intrinsic properties of experiences, but on many theories of 
experiences there are close links between the ascription of content and the ways in 
which experiences are ascribed and typed. The issues here have both epistemological 
and psychological dimensions. On the one hand, a theory of experiential content has a 
fundamental role in explaining how knowledge of the world can be acquired through 
experience. On the other hand, there are important psychological questions about the 
phenomenology of experiences and the conditions under which content ascriptions are 
made. 
 
[2] The debate about whether experiences have conceptual or nonconceptual content 
is highly relevant to both the epistemological and psychological issues. This is 
apparent in the work of Gareth Evans who is often cited as the first philosopher to 
propose a theory of nonconceptual content. This paper will explicate and examine 
Evans' theory. In particular, attention will be paid to Evans' claim that perceptually-
derived information with nonconceptual content can only qualify as a perceptual 
experience when it serves as input to a thinking, concept-applying, and reasoning 
system. We will sketch out a theoretical approach to the nature of nonconceptual 
content that builds on Evans' insight but does not follow him in this restrictive claim. 
 
Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content 
 
[3] The paradigm case of a state with content is a propositional attitude -- having a 
propositional attitude requires one to stand in a certain relation to a content. The 
content is demarcated by the clause which states what is believed, desired or wished. 
Contents have correctness conditions -- conditions under which they represent the 
world correctly. Although the content of propositional attitudes represent certain 
objects, properties and/or relations they are standardly taken (within a broadly 
Fregean tradition) to consist of concepts in such a way that a given content cannot be 
ascribed to an individual who does not possess the concepts employed in the 
canonical specification of that content. 
 
[4] This notion of conceptual content can be applied to perceptual experiences. When 
someone has a visual experience, for example, it will seem to that person as if 
something is seen. The proposition that specifies what seems to be seen, demarcates 
the content of the experience. This approach is demanded by any theory of perception 
that analyses perceptual states in terms of inclinations to believe (e.g. Armstrong 
1968). There are reasons for thinking, however, that visual experiences or 
informational states have a different type of content, namely, nonconceptual content. 
In so far as a creature can have an experience that represents the world and has 
correctness conditions, while not possessing the concepts required to specify how the 
world is represented in the experience, then one can say that the content of the 
experience or informational state is nonconceptual.1 Three main reasons for thinking 
this have been endorsed in the recent literature. 
 
[5] First, experiences are more fine-grained than conceptual contents. For example, 
one can see more shades of colour than one can name. Second, experiences are belief 
independent (Evans 1982: 123). One can continue to undergo an illusion even when 
one knows that things are not as they appear. It is equally possible not to believe what 
one seems to see. Lastly, describing and explaining a subject's behaviour may demand 
attributing a visual experience when the subject lacks the concepts required to specify 
the content of the experience in virtue of not being a concept-user at all. 
 
[6] It is important to distinguish these three motivations -- and in particular to keep 
the first two separate from the third. Many theorists who are prepared to accept the 
notion of non-conceptual content deny that creatures who possess no concepts at all 
can be in content-bearing states. That is to say, they deny what Christopher Peacocke 
has called the Autonomy Thesis, but which we prefer to call the Autonomy Principle:  
 
The Autonomy Principle It is possible for a creature to be in states with 
nonconceptual content, even though that creature possesses no concepts at all.2 
 
Nonconceptual contents can only fulfil the third explanatory role if the principle is 
true. The Autonomy Principle was first affirmed by Evans. As will emerge below, 
however, Evans' position is equivocal. He maintained the Autonomy Principle but 
denied that non-concept-users could have experiences. The main burden of this paper 
will be that Evans' position is inherently unstable. The Autonomy Principle is true and 
does not require Evans' qualification.  
 
[7] The significance of this depends, of course, on how widely the domain of concepts 
is held to extend. Consider the following principle:  
 
The Priority Principle Conceptual abilities are constitutively linked with 
linguistic abilities in such a way that conceptual abilities cannot be possessed by 
non-linguistic creatures.  
 
The constitutive connection between concepts and language emerges from the 
conditions upon the individuation of concepts -- which in turn are conditions upon 
what it is to possess or grasp a concept. Any acceptable account of what it is to 
possess a concept will have to include certain specifications of circumstances in 
which it is appropriate to apply that concept. But this is not all. Concepts form part of, 
and are individuated by their role in, the contents of propositional attitudes. Part of 
what it is to possess a given concept is that one should be able to recognise that 
certain circumstances give one good reasons to take particular attitudes to contents 
containing that concept. Moreover, concept mastery is also evidenced in dispositions 
to make and to accept as legitimate or justified certain inferential transitions between 
judgements. 
 
[8] The plausibility of the Priority Principle emerges from the constraints upon being 
able to appreciate rational grounds for certain inferences. It is certainly true that it is 
possible to be justified (or warranted) in making a certain inferential transition 
without being able to provide a justification (or warrant ) for that inferential transition. 
It is a familiar epistemological point, after all, that there is a difference between being 
justified in holding a belief and justifying that belief. What does not seem to be true is 
that it is possible to distinguish between justified and unjustified inferential transition 
if one is not capable of providing any justifications at all for any inferential 
transitions. But providing justifications is a paradigmatically linguistic activity. 
Providing justifications is a matter of identifying and articulating the reasons for a 
given classification, inference or judgement. It is because prelinguistic creatures are in 
principle incapable of providing such justifications that the Priority Principle is true. 
Mere sensitivity to the truth of inferential transitions involving a given concept is not 
enough for possession of that concept. Rational sensitivity is required, and rational 
sensitivity comes only with language mastery. 
 
[9] If the Priority Principle is accepted then the truth of the Autonomy Principle will 
follow if it is thought that the behaviour of nonlinguistic creatures requires 
explanation in intentional terms, since intentional explanation requires the ascription 
of content-involving states and (by the Priority Principle) those states will necessarily 
be nonconceptual. We shall not attempt to make the case here. One of us has argued 
the point elsewhere at some length (Bermúdez 1998). We shall take it that the 
Autonomy Thesis is true. Our main concern will be whether it needs to be qualified in 
the way that Evans proposed. 
 
Evans' Theory 
 
[10] Evans begins his account by taking the notion of being in an informational state 
with such-and-such content as being a primitive notion, not to be analysed in other 
terms (particularly not in terms of inclinations to believe):  
 
A certain mechanism produces things which have a certain informational 
content... The mechanism is a mechanism of information storage because the 
properties that figure in the content of its output are (to a degree determined by 
the accuracy of the mechanism) the properties possessed by the objects which 
are the input to it. And we can say that the product of such a mechanism is of 
the objects that were the input to the mechanism when the product was 
produced. (1982: 125)  
 
Perception and memory both involve informational states. So too does testimony. 
Belief, judgement and reasoning, in contrast, are more sophisticated activities than 
information-gathering. 
 
[11] Evans' paradigm example of informational content is the spatial element in 
auditory experiences (Evans 1982: section 6.3). This spatial element is given in terms 
of directions in egocentric space -- up, down, in front, behind etc. Evans claims that 
an informational state might loosely be thought to have such spatial content just if it 
embodies purported information about the environment in virtue of belonging to a set 
of inputs which vary systematically with some spatial facts. However, he says that in 
order for an organism to be in a state that has spatial significance for that organism -- 
that is in order for it to contain spatial content in a strict sense -- more is required. The 
organism must exhibit complex input-output connections of a certain type. It is not 
enough that an organism can merely discriminate between the relevant stimuli. An 
organism must exhibit input-output connections that are connected to spatial 
behaviour:  
 
We can say, then, that auditory input -- or rather that complex property of 
auditory input which encodes the direction of sound -- acquires a (non-
conceptual) spatial content for an organism by being linked with behavioural 
output in, presumably, an advantageous way. (Evans 1982: 156)  
 
Many of his examples involve animals that have the right kind of complex input-
output behaviour (such as rats swimming to a particular location where a sound is 
heard), and throughout the discussion he talks of what organisms and animals must be 
able to do (which clearly some can) to satisfy his constraints. 
 
[12] Nonetheless, Evans' commitment to what we earlier termed the Autonomy 
Principle is highly circumscribed. He argues that not all informational states with 
nonconceptual content count as experiences:  
 
It seems abundantly clear that evolution could throw up an organism in which 
such advantageous links were established [the input-output links required in 
order for a creature to have informational states with nonconceptual content], 
long before it had provided us with a conscious subject of experience. (1982: 
157-158)  
 
The actual example he gives of informational states that are not experiences is 
blindsight.3 He says that people who suffer from blindsight may have the right input-
output connections regarding their behaviour. The performance of blindsight patients 
on certain matching and other tasks shows that they are capable of performing certain 
perceptual discriminations in their blindfield, and hence that at some level they are 
picking up visual information about a portion of the distal environment that they 
claim not to be able to see. Nonetheless, as is well-known, blindsight patients report 
themselves to be merely guessing in the tasks on which they perform significantly 
above chance -- and they tend to be incapable of using the information which they 
seem nonetheless to be picking up to initiate actions. It is equally well-known that 
blindsight patients report themselves as lacking any sort of phenomenal consciousness 
of what is going on in their blindfields. 
 
[13] Things become clearer, however, when we remember that for Evans an 
informational state can only count as a conscious experience if it:  
 
serves as the input to a thinking, concept-applying and reasoning system; so that 
the subject's thoughts, plans and deliberations are also systematically dependent 
on the informational properties of the input. When there is such a link we can 
say that the person, rather than some part of his brain, receives and processes 
the information. (Evans 1982: 158)  
 
The interesting feature of blindsight patients is that their residual abilities are 
evidenced only in forced-choice situations in which they take themselves to be 
guessing. They can make discriminations at a level substantially above chance, but 
not in a way that feeds into their practical deliberations and intentional actions. It is 
tempting to explain this by holding that the discriminative abilities are not 
experientially-based.  
 
[14] But even granting this interpretation of the behaviour of blindsight patients, it is 
not clear that it dictates the general principle that experiences are only available to 
concept-applying creatures. The direction of explanation is important. The blindsight 
case warrants the claim that there may be forms of perceptual sensitivity that are not 
experiential and that their not being experiential explains why they do not feed into 
the subject's 'concept-applying and reasoning system'. This is a long way from the 
claim that, when a subject has a concept-applying and reasoning system, no form of 
perceptual sensitivity will count as experiential unless it is in principle capable of 
feeding into that system -- a claim that in any case seems problematic in virtue of the 
well-known cognitive impenetrability of optical illusions. And it is hard to see how to 
get from either of those to the claim that nothing can count as an experience unless it 
feeds into a concept-applying and reasoning system. 
 
[15] Evans suggests that "our intuitive concept requires a subject of experience to 
have thoughts" (Evans 1982: 158). This would yield the desired conclusion on the 
assumption that no subject can have thoughts unless it is a concept-user -- 
alternatively, that there can be no reasoning without concepts. The proposal, however, 
is doubly flawed. In the first place the appeal to intuition seems misplaced (even 
allowing that there is an intuitive concept associated with what seems clearly to be a 
philosophical term of art). To the extent that common-sense makes a clear distinction 
between thinking and sentience it seems to imply their potential separability.  
 
[16] More significantly, the claim seems to be either trivial or unwarranted. If it is 
being claimed that there can be no conceptual thought without concepts then it is 
trivial. But on the other hand there seems to be no reason to believe (and considerable 
reason not to believe) that thinking is only possible for concept-possessors/language-
users. The evidence from developmental psychology and cognitive ethology seems 
clearly against Evans, on the plausible assumption that the applicability of intentional 
explanations to a creature implies that the creature is capable of thinking.4 To hold 
that a creature's behaviour is to be explained in intentional terms is to credit that 
creature with the capacity to reason about how best to satisfy its desires in the light of 
the information it possesses about the environment.  
 
[17] One might combine these two points by saying that the claimed intuitive 
connection between being a subject of experience and being a thinker holds only 
when the requirements for a creature to be a thinker have been weakened so that they 
will not be able to do the work for which Evans tries to employ them. The plausible 
sense in which an experiencer must be a thinker is not going to yield the requirement 
that a thinker be a concept possessor.  
 
[18] It is interesting that Evans seems to be pulled in opposite directions on this issue. 
A certain residual neo-Kantianism (no doubt inherited from Strawson) drives him 
towards a package of views that runs through The Varieties of Reference, although 
more often presupposed than argued for directly. The strictures which he places on the 
notion of a subject of experience fall very naturally out of this neo-Kantianism. 
Prominent within this package is a deep-seated belief that consciousness cannot exist 
without self-consciousness and awareness of an objective world. He also firmly 
believed in the distinctiveness of persons and a corresponding need to keep the "realm 
of the rational" separate from the "realm of the natural". It is eminently natural, then, 
for him to make a distinction between, on the one hand, the personal level of rational, 
deliberating, language-using agents, employing concepts and sensitive to the rational 
relations holding between them and, on the other, the subpersonal level at which we 
are dealing with mechanisms and systems whose states, although they carry content, 
carry only a form of informational content insufficiently rich to underwrite genuine 
cognition. Once this step has been taken it is a natural next step to apply this thin 
conception of informational content to those cognitive agents that do not display the 
linguistic and conceptual skills characteristic of persons. Such cognitive agents 
represent the world, but not in a way that allows them to be genuinely conscious of it 
or to think about it. 
 
[19] This neo-Kantian strand in his thought sits uneasily, however, with the 
naturalistic thread that also runs through The Varieties of Reference. In part this 
naturalism reveals itself in the significance he attaches to the notion of causality and 
in his sensitivity to empirical work. Most importantly, however, it reveals itself in 
what is probably his most fundamental philosophical innovation, namely, his 
recasting of the Fregean notion of the sense or mode of presentation of a singular 
term. As classically understood the sense of a singular term is given in terms of a 
cluster of definite descriptions serving to identify the object picked out by the singular 
term. Evans' great innovation was to replace this way of understanding the notion of 
sense with one based more on abilities, dispositions and capacities. The mode of 
presentation of a particular point in space is given in terms of the subject's ability to 
locate it in both egocentric and absolute space -- and hence ultimately in terms of his 
navigational skills. The mode of presentation of a perceived object is given in terms 
of the subject's ability to keep track of it. The mode of presentation of the self is given 
by the subject's sensitivity to particular forms of self-specifying information (from 
proprioception, autobiographical memories etc.). This second naturalistic strand in 
Evans' thought militates against the isolationism of the first strand. These abilities, 
dispositions and capacities do not seem constitutively linked with the high-level 
conceptual, reasoning and linguistic skills characteristic of the domain of persons. 
Certainly the least convincing sections of The Varieties of Reference are those where 
Evans tries to bring his innovations into line with his neo-Kantian isolationism.5 
 
[20] Evans' thinking about experience and nonconceptual content reflects the strains 
imposed by these two conflicting pressures. His espousal of what we have termed the 
Autonomy Principle is motivated by the naturalistic strand in his thought, but his 
denial that experience is possible in the absence of conceptual thought and reasoning 
is clearly motivated by the isolationism that comes with his neo-Kantianism. As we 
have tried to bring out, the position that emerged is inherently unstable. In the next 
section we will develop further a view intended to restore stability by side-lining the 
unhelpful isolationism and foregrounding the innovative variety of naturalism that we 
believe to be Evans' greatest contribution to analytical philosophy. 
 
Nonconceptual Content and Perceptual Experience: Some Further Thoughts 
 
[21] As we have seen, Evans' view that perceptually-derived information states with 
nonconceptual content only become perceptual experiences when they serve as input 
into a concept-applying and reasoning system seems to get the direction of 
explanation the wrong way round in the only example he gives. The residual abilities 
of blindsight patients seem to suggest the presence of perceptual states with 
nonconceptual content which do not feed into the concept-applying and reasoning 
system because they are not experientially-based. In this final section we sketch out a 
way of thinking about the content of experience that generalises this interpretation of 
blindsight. 
 
[22] We start with some reflections about the nature and functional role of 
phenomenal consciousness made by Robert Van Gulick. Van Gulick's position is 
based upon an articulation of three different aspects of phenomenally conscious states. 
He holds that these three different aspects can be identified and distinguished in all 
normal cases of psychological states with phenomenal character. They are:  
 
(a) phenomenal consciousness 
(b) capacities for perceptually-based discriminations 
(c) semantic transparency 
 
Of these only (c) is likely to be unfamiliar. Here are a couple of passages in which he 
explains what he means by 'semantic transparency': 
 
The extent to which a representation is semantically transparent is a matter of 
how readily and completely its content or meaning is accessible to the user of 
the representation. . . When we have a conscious visual experience, we normally 
know and understand what is being represented to us, and with almost no effort 
can make appropriate links to a vast amount of background knowledge. (Van 
Gulick 1994: 29) 
 
Phenomenal representations, of the sort associated with normal conscious 
experience, involve a very high degree of semantic transparency. Indeed, they 
are so transparent that we normally 'look' right through them. Our experience is 
the experience of a world of familiar objects -- of desks, chairs, coffee cups and 
beech trees. Moreover, this transparency is to some extent an immediately 
experienced feature of our conscious life (Van Gulick 1993: 149).  
 
The key is the relation between semantic transparency and the initiation and control of 
action. It is the semantic transparency of phenomenal consciousness that makes 
information about the distal environment picked up through perception available to 
the subject in a form that will allow it to be used in the initiation and control of action.  
 
[23] Van Gulick makes this point very interestingly in the context of blindsight 
patients:  
 
Are there any features of phenomenal representation that help to explain why 
we should need it to bring information to bear on our intentional action? Recall 
what we noted above about the high degree to which phenomenal 
representations are semantically transparent; their content is readily accessible 
and capable of being applied in a wide range of contexts. . . Because the 
information blindsighted patients extract from visual stimuli fails to be 
incorporated into their phenomenal representation of the world, it remains 
disconnected from and inaccessible to the action-guiding systems that lie at the 
core of their personalities. It cannot be brought to bear on any of the self-
conscious or deliberate choices or actions that they undertake as persons. (34-5)  
 
The generalisation seems to lie ready to hand. Perceptually-derived information states 
with nonconceptual content only become perceptual experiences when they offer a 
mode of presentation of perceptually derived information that allows it to feed into 
the initiation and control of action.6 
 
[24] Reflection on the nature of conscious experience brings out how phenomenal 
consciousness is organised to secure the implementation of this functional role. 
Phenomenal consciousness is essentially integrative. It brings together disparate items 
of information from a range of sources and binds them together into a unified 
structure (see Lowe 1996 for further discussion). Van Gulick himself stresses that 
phenomenal consciousness "represents the unity and continuity of space by the 
unified continuous manifold of the subjective visual field" (1994: 35). It also presents 
objects in the distal environment as bearing spatial relations to each other. Moreover, 
and this is something that is less frequently stressed, it presents objects in the 
perceived environment as bearing spatial relations to the perceiving subject. This last 
feature offers a particularly clear illustration of why phenomenal consciousness might 
be thought essential for the initiation of environment-directed action. It seems 
plausible to hold that one cannot determine to act in an environment-directed manner 
without an understanding of the spatial relations in which one stands to the relevant 
features of the environment. 
 
[25] Van Gulick essentially stops at this point -- which is unfortunate because it is 
here that things get difficult and interesting. Everything that he says about the nature 
of perceptual experience seems right. It is hard to disagree with any of these points 
about the integrative role of phenomenal consciousness. Unfortunately, the real 
problems are just about to start. Because the most pressing question that all of this 
raises is how we are supposed to come up with a theory of the content of perceptual 
experience which will allow us to capture and explain these integrative features of 
phenomenal consciousness. 
 
[26] The basic idea that we would like to put across is that without a suitably worked 
out theory of nonconceptual content we will simply not be able to give an account of 
what it is about phenomenal consciousness that allows it to exercise its functional 
role. The semantic transparency which Van Gulick latches on to is a function of the 
application of higher-level conceptual abilities. Van Gulick's notion of semantic 
transparency is a matter of how meaningful the subject finds the perceived 
environment and is constitutively tied to classificatory and recognitional abilities 
which are best understood in terms of concept mastery. These classificatory and 
recognitional abilities presuppose, however, an organisation of conscious experience 
which is both logically and ontogenetically (and indeed phylogenetically) more 
primitive than concept mastery (Bermúdez 1995b, 1998). Certain aspects of the 
theory of the nonconceptual representational content of phenomenal consciousness 
are peculiarly appropriate to explaining how phenomenal consciousness can fulfil the 
functional role of presenting perceptually derived information in a way in which it can 
directly feed into the initiation and control of action. We would like to make two 
points in support of this general thesis -- the first illustrative and second 
programmatic.  
 
[27] It is a familiar point that the explanation of action requires attributing indexical 
thoughts to agents -- thoughts which fix their temporal and spatial locations and 
which explain the immediate salience of what they perceive to what they actually do. 
This has been accommodated by several theorists at the conceptual level. John Perry 
has employed an argument from "the essential indexical" against standard construals 
of the Fregean notion of sense (Perry 1977, 1979).7 Peacocke has also argued that any 
rationally intelligible explanation of an agent's actions must have a demonstrative 
component (Peacocke 1986). Yet this indexicality can equally be accommodated at 
the level of nonconceptual content.  
 
[28] Indeed, what we find when we compare conceptual content and nonconceptual 
content is that nonconceptual content is always indexical. Whether conceptual content 
is understood in terms of sets of possible worlds, Russellian compounds of individuals 
and properties or Fregean senses it is nonetheless the case that the actual specification 
of any content that is not explicitly indexical will contain no reference to any relations 
in which a thinker might stand to the content in question. The relation between thinker 
and this content comes with the attitudes that the thinker takes to the content. It is 
external to the content itself. This is not, however, the case with nonconceptual 
content. Here the relation between thinker and content is always internal to the 
content. It is part of the way in which objects are represented that the perceiver stands 
in certain relations to them. In other words, one could say that while conceptual 
content may or may not be indexical, nonconceptual content always contains an 
indexical element. The indexical element provides one reason for why the 
nonconceptual content of experiences is such that it can feed directly into the control 
of actions -- because it provides information about the relationship between the 
perceiver and the world.  
 
[29] This emerges particularly in the account of perception developed by the 
psychologist J. J. Gibson. A recurrent theme in Gibson's experimental and theoretical 
work is that self-specifying information is an integral part of the content of perceptual 
experience. We can identify three different types of such self-specifying information 
(for further details see Gibson 1979 and Bermúdez 1998 Ch.5):  
 
(1) Information about bodily invariants that bound the field of vision. The outline 
and contours of the body impose a higher-order invariant structure on the field of 
vision. All objects, bodily and nonbodily, can present a range of solid angles in the 
field of vision (where a solid angle is an angle with its apex at the eye and its base 
at some perceived object), with the size of those angles varying according to the 
distance of the object from the point of observation. The further away the object 
the smaller the angle. Bodily parts are distinctive in that the range of solid angles 
they present is very limited. 
 
(2) Information from visual kinesthesis about the movement of the perceiver. How 
can the mass of constantly changing visual information generated by the subject's 
motion be decoded so that subjects perceive themselves to be moving through a 
stable environment. Gibson's insight is that information about the subject's 
movement is already contained in the patterns of flow in the optic array and 
relations between variant and invariant features in the visual field. Striking 
illustrations of this are provided by the "moving-room" experiments (Lishman and 
Lee 1973) in which subjects compensate for an illusion of movement generated by 
moving the walls of the room while keeping the floor stationary.  
 
(3) Information about the possibilities for action and reaction that the environment 
affords the perceiver. Objects and surfaces in the environment have properties that 
are relevant to the abilities of particular animals, that allow different animals to act 
and react in different ways. On Gibson's analysis, information specifying 
affordances is directly available in the structure of the light to be picked up by 
animals as they move around the world. Affordances are higher-order perceptual 
invariants.  
These features of perceptual experience must be accommodated at the 
nonconceptual level. Indeed, the experimental evidence that perceptual sensitivity 
to self-specifying information in visual perception is present widely in the animal 
kingdom and from the first days of infancy in humans.  
 
[30] Another feature of the indexicality of perceptual content that has been stressed by 
Christopher Peacocke in this context is its analogue nature (Peacocke 1986). The term 
analogue has been used to express many different qualities of perception. It is fine-
grained and carries lots of detailed information. It varies in a way that analogue 
devices, such as the hands of a clock that tell the time do, as opposed to the discrete 
intervals that a digital watch displays, which is more akin to the manner in which 
conceptual content represents. One particular notion of analogue experiential content 
is concerned with the way in which magnitudes are represented. When we see a 
distance or length, although we see the length it is, we do not see the length it is in 
miles, kilometres, inches or centimetres -- we do not come to know what the length is 
in any units unless, for example, there is a measuring device around. This is not 
simply a fact about phenomenology, but also an essential part of explaining how we 
can act on distal objects without any propositional knowledge of their distance from 
us. 
 
[31] The unit-free nature of perception seems capturable only at the level of 
nonconceptual content. First, it seems plausible (although Peacocke would deny this) 
that unit-free perceptions are available to non-concept-possessing creatures. Indeed, 
this seems to follow straightforwardly from the essential indexicality of intentional 
explanations of behaviour together with the fact that intentional explanations are 
applicable to non-concept-possessors. But second, even in creatures who do possess 
concepts, the unit-free nature of perception cannot be captured at the level of 
conceptual content. The only candidate at the conceptual level would be some form of 
demonstrative content such as "that length" or "that direction". Yet, as Peacocke 
notes, a subject could have an experience in which two lengths looked the same to 
them. Associated with each of these lengths could be a unique demonstrative mode of 
presentation -- "that length". The subject might nonetheless wonder whether the two 
lengths are actually the same and it is possible that they might come to find out that in 
fact they were the same length. Thus, it would be informative for the subject to know 
that the first "that length" was the same as the second "that length", and therefore the 
two demonstrative modes of presentation would not be the same, according to Frege's 
criterion for the identity of modes of presentation. So, in order to characterise the 
content of the perception that the two lengths look to the subject to be the same we 
need to move to the level of nonconceptual content. 
 
[32] One question now becomes pressing. Does a perceptually-derived informational 
state become an experiential state (become phenomenally conscious) just in virtue of 
providing information about the relationship between the subject and the environment 
in the ways just specified? The answer might be thought to be no because of 
sleepwalking and associated phenomena. People have been known to navigate their 
way through an environment, perform quite complex tasks and even drive cars. If this 
is so, and (as seems overwhelmingly plausible) these people are not conscious of their 
actions, then it follows that being in perceptual nonconceptual states that allow for 
complex environment-related actions is not sufficient for being conscious. 
 
[33] These and related examples, however, only show that the above is only the first 
part of a full story of how the content of phenomenal consciousness allows it to fulfil 
its functional role of presenting perceptual information in a manner that allows it to 
feed directly into the initiation and control of action. We end this paper 
programmatically by gesturing to how such a full story might be achieved. Whether 
sleepwalkers have some conscious awareness of their environment or not is unclear. 
They are certainly not, however, in states that are fully-integrated in time, either 
before or after the episode, with the rest of their mental lives. This brings out that we 
also need to consider the contents of perception over time. The fact that a body takes a 
single trajectory through the world is reflected in the changing contents of the normal 
perceptually-based experiential events associated with that body. This series of 
perceptually-based states reflects a point of view, a perspective on the world (to use 
two rather overworked terms). Here too, it is a fact about the content of the 
perceptually-based events within a psychological life that they reflect a point of view 
upon the world. This is something that we might also expect to receive theoretical 
articulation in a fully-developed theory of nonconceptual content. Such a theory will 
bring together an understanding of different forms of navigational skills, their 
concomitant nonconceptual representations of the spatial properties of the 
environment and the integration of associated states over time. 
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Notes 
 
1Evans (1982), Peacocke (1994), Tye (1995) and Bermœdez (1998) are amongst those 
who postulate nonconceptual content.  
 
2 For a discussion of the autonomy of nonconceptual content see Bermúdez (1994), 
Peacocke (1994), Bermúdez (1995) and Bermúdez (1998).  
 
3 The blindsight example is itself odd in at least one respect. Evans seems to want to 
disqualify most, if not all, animals as potential subjects of experience and we surely 
do not think of any animals on the model of those humans who have blindsight. 
Indeed, some of the work carried out by psychologists on blindsight has been to 
experiment with animals by removing part of their visual cortex to induce blindsight 
in them (Humphrey 1993: 68). Thus, if we can distinguish between animals with 
blindsight and those without, animals should not in general be compared to human 
blindsighted subjects. 
 
4 For further discussion see Bermúdez (1998). 
 
5 The appendix to chapter 7 is a case in point. Unfortunately the least convincing 
sections of the book are often the most celebrated. 
 
6 We say this without committing ourselves on the question of whether the nature of 
perceptual experiences is exhausted by their information-presenting role. 
 
7 Evans himself responded to Perry's attack on Frege in his (1985) which is a useful 
source for his reconstrual of the Fregean conception of sense. For comments on the 
debate see Dummett (1991). 
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